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Abstract The role of financial incentives in HIV care is
not well studied. We conducted a single-site study of
monetary incentives for viral load suppression, using each
patient as his own control. The incentive size ($100/quarter)
was designed to be cost-neutral, offsetting estimated
downstream costs averted through reduced HIV transmis-
sion. Feasibility outcomes were clinic workflow, patient
acceptability, and patient comprehension. Although the
study was not powered for effectiveness, we also analyzed
viral load suppression. Of 80 eligible patients, 77 consented,
and 69 had 12 month follow-up. Feasibility outcomes
showed minimal impact on patient workflow, near-unani-
mous patient acceptability, and satisfactory patient com-
prehension. Among individuals with detectable viral loads
pre-intervention, the proportion of undetectable viral load
tests increased from 57 to 69 % before versus after the
intervention. It is feasible to use financial incentives to
reward ART adherence, and to specify the incentive by
requiring cost-neutrality and targeting biological outcomes.
Keywords Financial incentives  Adherence 
Antiretroviral therapy  HIV/AIDS
Introduction
Financial incentives may influence behaviors that are
resistant to change by providing positive reinforcement [1].
Effective financial incentives employ basic principles of
behavior reinforcement, including identification of a target
behavior, frequent collection of an objective measure of
that behavior, selection of desirable reinforcement, and
consistent and immediate link between target behavior and
reinforcers [1]. While financial incentives have been most
commonly studied to reduce substance misuse [2–9], they
are increasingly evaluated in other areas where therapeu-
tically relevant behaviors may be targeted, including
adherence with prescribed medications [10, 11]. However,
using financial incentives to increase adherence to anti-
retroviral therapy (ART) is not well studied, even though
finding new interventions to improve ART adherence is of
paramount importance to public health. ART nonadherence
remains highly prevalent [12] despite the reduced pill
burden and side effects of newer regimens. ART nonad-
herence is an important cause of preventable morbidity and
mortality among HIV-infected patients, and is a major
cause of HIV transmission [13, 14].
Accordingly, we sought to conduct a pilot study to
evaluate the feasibility of using a financial incentive to
improve ART adherence. Our study was motivated by
several design goals that are unusual in studies of financial
incentives [2–9]: First, to address concerns that financial
incentives are not sustainable or scalable because they are
too expensive [1], the size of the incentive was designed to
be cost-neutral or cost-saving, guided by a calculation
regarding downstream HIV costs averted by preventing
HIV transmission through viral load reduction. Second, to
link the incentive tightly to preventable morbidity and
mortality, the primary target of the incentive was viral load
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suppression rather than a more direct measure of adher-
ence. Third, to be easily understood and accepted by the
target population (e.g., patients of lower education and
socioeconomic status), the incentive algorithm rewarded
improvement as well as achievement, was not easily game-
able, yet was concise and transparent.
Methods
Intervention
Our study intervention consisted of a monetary payment
($100) contingent on an ‘‘either/or’’ reward criterion:
patients needed to either (1) suppress their plasma HIV
RNA below the lower limit of detection of the assay used in
our clinic (Roche HIV—1 Monitor Cobas, 48 copies/ml), or
(2) demonstrate a viral load that is at least one log10 lower
than their prior lowest viral load in the past year (Table 1).
Size of Incentive
We chose $100 as the size of the incentive because it was a
round figure that approximated the minimum future health
costs averted by reducing viral load by one log10 unit
($112, Table 1), based on assuming an extremely conser-
vative (that is, lower bound) pre-ART transmission rate of
0.01 per person per year. We based our calculation on
an extremely conservative transmission risk to pre-empt
any concern that the incentive was not cost-neutral or
cost-saving. We estimated health costs averted by calcu-
lating the reduction in annual probability of transmitting
HIV for a person who knows his/her serostatus, has typical
risk behavior, has substantial viral load suppression due to
partial adherence and with an additional potential decrease
of 1 log unit with perfect adherence (Table 1). We then
multiplied this estimation by the downstream HIV costs
avoided by averting a new HIV infection ($360,500 in
2012 US dollars) [15]. Therefore, the financial incentive,
while substantial, and in line with other incentives that
impact behavior resistant to change (e.g., smoking) [16],
would not increase health care costs over long time hori-
zons, an attribute that may enhance its scalability and
sustainability.
Target of Incentive
We chose to make the target of the incentive a clinical
outcome (viral load suppression) rather than the behavior
itself (ART adherence) because we sought a target that was
closely linked to preventable morbidity and mortality, and
because viral load is a more objective measure than most
measures of adherence (e.g., for example, medication
bottles with sensors can be received and opened, but
medication may not be taken). Additionally, it can be
argued that the vast majority of variability in viral load is
attributable to variations in patient adherence, and much of
the variability that is not attributable to patient adherence is
attributable to ineffective ART regimens, which can also
typically be affected through patient behavior (e.g.,
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0.01 0.00592 $2,134 $533 0.00124 $448 $112
0.02 0.01184 $4,268 $1,067 0.00249 $896 $224
0.05 0.02960 $10,670 $2,668 0.00622 $2,241 $560
0.10 0.05920 $21,341 $5,335 0.01240 $4,482 $1,120
0.20 0.11840 $42,683 $10,671 0.02490 $8,963 $2,241
We calculated the reduction in annual probability of transmitting HIV for a person who knows his serostatus and has typical risk behavior, and
multiplied this estimation by the downstream HIV costs avoided by averting a new HIV infection ($360,500, based on an inflation-updated
version of the estimate by Schackman et al. [15]). We performed calculations alternatively assuming (1) no viral load suppression from partial
ART adherence below an assumed pre-ART baseline of 4.4 log units, and (2) substantial viral load suppression from partial adherence to a level 1
log unit above the assay detection threshold. We performed calculations for pre-ART transmission rates across a wide range of risk behavior
profiles informed by recent United States estimates (0.01 transmissions per person per year, lowest, to 0.20 transmissions per person per year,
highest) [23]. Our base case assumption (0.01 transmissions per person per year) was very conservative, below the transmission rate observed in
HPTN 052 (0.017 transmissions per person per year) [14] or most recent estimates of the United States HIV transmission rate (0.041 trans-
missions per person per year) [24]. We assumed that each log 10 decrease in viral load below 4.4 decreased infectivity by 59 %, based on results
from the Rakai study [25], and consistent with more recent results from HPTN 052 (65 %) [14]. Our most conservative estimate for costs averted
per quarter ($112) was used as the basis of our incentive payment ($100)
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working with their clinicians to find a more effective ART
regimen). For these reasons, we thought it was reasonable
to link the incentive to the clinical outcome rather than to
the behavior itself. However, we noted that this approach
may not be suited to individuals who have multidrug
resistance.
Criteria for Incentive
We chose an ‘‘either/or’’ reward criterion (undetectable
viral load OR demonstration of a viral load that is at least
one log10 lower than their prior lowest viral load in the
past year; Table 2) because we wanted to reward
improvement as well as achievement. We chose the last
year as a comparator, rather than a single test result or a
shorter time interval, to avoid the possibility that patients
would ‘‘game’’ the incentive by deliberately alternating
periods of poorer adherence with periods of better adher-
ence. To avoid the possibility of patients seeking multiple
payments for the same quarter, a patient could not qualify
for more than one incentive payment in a 3 month window,
an interval which corresponds to the usual frequency of
viral load measurement in the clinic. Patients were not
allowed ‘‘second chances’’ to earn the incentives during a
3 month window, and therefore blood tests were not
repeated at the patient’s request until the next quarter,
unless desired by the patient’s clinician. Thus the study
required no additional blood tests.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
We targeted the financial incentive towards individuals
with detectable viral load during the last year, and used
each patient as his own control. Consequently, our initial
inclusion criteria were any individual enrolled in clinic
who was receiving ART for at least 1 year, had at least one
detectable viral load within the last year, and who was
capable of giving informed consent. We did not supple-
ment the historical controls with an additional concurrent
control group because this was not an effectiveness study,
and because there were insufficient numbers of patients to
make this a feasible option. We broadened our initial
inclusion criteria when concerns were raised by the clinic
director and the IRB concerning the fairness of the study.
In particular, if only patients with detectable viral load
were eligible for study inclusion, and therefore only
patients with detectable viral load were eligible for
receiving the financial incentives, this criterion could be
viewed as penalizing people who had achieved satisfactory
viral load control during the past year. Based on this
concern, we broadened study inclusion criteria to include
all patients receiving ART in the past year regardless of
viral load detectability; however, we pre-specified the
subgroup of patients with at least one detectable viral load
as the target population of greatest interest.
Each participant was briefed about whether they did or
did not qualify for the incentive by the study research
coordinator, not by the patient’s clinician. The study
coordinator initiated a scripted discussion, using the
incentive schedule (Table 2) as a visual prompt, and rein-
forcing the assessment when necessary by reviewing the
patient’s lab values over the past year. These visits could
either occur before or after the patients’ scheduled clinician
visit. Most study visits occurred immediately before or
after the clinician visit, although patients were permitted to
receive their briefing on a later day if they wanted to leave
the clinic immediately. While the patient’s clinician was
allowed to discuss laboratory results as part of normal care
during the visit, she was discouraged from revealing or
discussing whether or not the patient qualified for the
incentive.
Outcomes
The intervention was applied for 1 year (4 quarters). Fea-
sibility outcomes were (1) impact on clinic workflow, (2)
patient acceptability, and (3) patient comprehension. We
assessed impact on clinic workflow by interviewing clini-
cians who had patients that participated in the study. We
assessed patient acceptability by recording instances when
patients were unsatisfied or disappointed as a consequence
of the study intervention (e.g., they did not receive the
incentive, yet they thought they would or should). We
assessed patient comprehension by asking the study coor-
dinator about whether patients understood the incentive
system, as well as whether they could correctly predict
whether they qualified for it based on their most recent lab
result.
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Although the study was not powered for effectiveness,
we performed exploratory analyses of viral load suppres-
sion and ART adherence using each patient as his own
control, comparing the intervention year with the prior year.
We compared (1) proportion of viral load measurements
that were undetectable, (2) area under the curve (AUC) viral
load during the last year, and (3) ART adherence, assessed
by number of ART medication fills during the period of
analysis.
HIV-1 RNA tests done during the two years were used
to assess the proportion of tests with undetectable virus.
The limit of detection during the entire study was 48
copies/ml. Because results were not always available for
the exact start and end dates, additional viral load tests
90 days beyond the start and end of the two year period
(Fig. 1) were obtained. These were used to estimate the
level of virus at the start of the prior year, at the start of the
intervention, and at the end of the intervention. Estimates
were made by interpolating values obtained on dates on
either side of the target date. These were then used in AUC
analysis.
AUC viral load is a measure of a person’s cumulative
exposure to HIV-1 RNA over time [17]. The AUC is
determined using the trapezoid rule to approximate the
area under each patient’s longitudinal curve of HIV-RNA
versus time. For each segment, the mean of the two
measurements is multiplied by the number of days
between measurements to determine area. Individual
areas are summed to create the AUC. To account for
differences in the number of days included the area is
divided by the number of days giving AUC/day. Unde-
tectable viral loads were assumed to have a value of
48 copies/ml.
Statistical Methods
All eligible patients were included in ‘‘intent-to-treat’’
analysis. Only those that completed the entire intervention
year were included in ‘‘as-treated’’ analysis. Proportions
were compared using the v2 test; means were compared
with the paired sample t test. All analyses were performed
with SAS version 9.2 (SAS institute, Cary, NC).
No imputation was performed for patients who were lost-
to-follow up or who died in the intent-to-treat analysis.
Results
Of 80 eligible patients, 77 consented to participate in the
incentive program (Table 3), and 69 were available for
12 month follow-up (3 died; 3 relocations; 2 lost to follow-
up). Median age was 59, all were male, 62 % were non-
white, and 48 % had history of alcohol dependence
(assessed by inclusion in the problem list of the electronic
health record and/or presence of corresponding ICD-9
diagnostic codes), 52 % had history of injection drug use,
and 34 % had history of depression. 52 % (N = 40) had C1
detectable viral load during the year prior to the incentive.
Most patients (59 %) were on PI-based regimens, with a
minority on NNRTI-based regimens (29 %) or other regi-
mens (12 %). Patients were treatment experienced, with
60 % on third or later ART regimens. Of the 51 patients
(74 %) with genotypic resistance testing, 33 (65 %) had
wild-type virus, 9 (18 %) had one-class resistance, and 9
(18 %) had two or more-class resistance. All but 5 patients
were on ART 2 years prior to enrollment and all but 1
patient was on ART 18 months prior to enrollment.
Feasibility Outcomes
The intervention did not seem to have an adverse effect on
clinic workflow. Patients were able to learn whether they
qualified for the incentive either before or after their clinician
visit. Time required for the qualification updates was
approximately 5–10 min. No clinician expressed frustration
about the impact of the study on workflow as the research
activity occurred after and separate from the patient visit.
The clinic administrator was moderately concerned at the
beginning of the study about workflow challenges, but by the
end of the study, she no longer had concerns.
The incentive was acceptable to all patients except for
one, who expressed frustration after his first quarter of
participation because he did not qualify for the incentive.
His frustration was exhibited verbally, but without any
Start of study
xPre Pre Post xPost





180 days Jan, Feb, Mar 2010 180 days
Fig. 1 Time course of study
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threatening words or actions. However, he chose to con-
tinue participating in the study, and during the subsequent
quarter he qualified for the incentive, and became pleased
with the intervention. Occasionally patients had to wait to
be seen by study personnel after their clinician visit, but
this was generally not an issue of concern.
Patients generally appeared to understand the incentive
system, and could correctly predict whether or not they
Table 3 Characteristics of patients enrolled in study





N = 77 N = 69
N (%) N (%)
Enrolled 0.24 v2 2.9 v2
January 37 48.1 33 47.8
February 24 31.2 20 29
March 16 20.8 16 23.2
Race 0.62 v2 1.0 v2
Black 41 53.2 36 52.2
White 29 37.7 26 37.7
Unknown 7 9.1 7 10.1
Ethnicity 0.78 v2 0.5 v2
Non-hispanic 69 89.6 62 89.9
Hispanic 6 7.8 5 7.2
Other 2 2.6 2 2.9
Detectable virus in year prior
to enrollment
40 51.9 33 47.8 0.03 v2 4.5 v2
Log HIV RNA at enrollment,
mean (SD)
1.9 (0.56) 1.8 (0.31) 0.24 t 1.3 t test, Satterthwaite for
unequal variances
CD4 at enrollment, mean (SD) 503 (240) 517 (236) 0.12 t -1.6 t test, pooled variance
Year of HIV diagnosis 0.83 v2 0.4 v2
\1990 15 19.5 13 18.8
1990–1999 36 46.8 32 46.4
2000? 26 33.8 24 34.8
Median (IQR) 1996 (1992–2002) 1996 (1992–2002)
Years since diagnosis 0.66 v2 0.8 v2
\10 years 20 26 19 27.5
10–19 years 41 53.2 36 52.2
20? years 16 20.8 14 20.3
Median (IQR) 16 (9–19) 15 (9–19)
Antiretroviral therapy regimen 0.44 v2 1.6 v2
First 11 (14.3) 11 (15.9)
Second 20 (26.0) 18 (26.1)
Third or more 46 (59.7) 40 (58.0)
Injection drug use 0.60 v2 1.0 v2
None 30 39 27 39.1
History 40 51.9 35 50.7
Unknown 7 9.1 7 10.1
Alcohol dependence 0.65 v2 1.6 v2
None 29 37.7 25 36.2
History 37 48.1 33 47.8
Current 4 5.2 4 5.8
Unknown 7 9.1 7 10.1
Hepatitis C infected 41 53.2 35 50.7 0.19 v2 1.7 v2
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qualified for it based on their current and prior laboratory
results. There were no complaints about unfairness or lack
of transparency. However, during the first quarter, there
were some confusion about the timing of, and eligibility for
the incentives. Some patients who did not qualify for
incentive expressed concern that although they were
adherent with all antiretroviral therapy, clinic appoint-
ments, and study requirements, they were disappointed that
they were not able to receive at least a portion of the
incentive (i.e. those with improved but still low detectable
HIV viral load). These concerns were generally resolved by
the second quarter through education by the research staff.
No patients expressed concerns that the incentive tar-
geted a clinical outcome rather than a behavior itself, and
there was acceptance of the premise that they could control
the viral load by taking their medications with greater
regularity, and/or working with their clinician to find a
more effective drug regimen.
Effectiveness Outcomes
Among the patient subgroup targeted by the study (indi-
viduals with prior detectable viral loads), the proportion of
undetectable viral load tests increased from 57 to 69 %
before versus after the intervention (v2 = 4.7, p = 0.03)
for intent-to-treat analyses, and 59 to 71 % in the as-treated
patients (v2 = 4.1, p = 0.04). Patients without any unde-
tectable viral loads did not appear to be impacted by the
intervention, whereas patients with occasionally undetect-
able viral loads appeared to have greater proportions of
undetectable viral load tests after the intervention (Fig. 2).
There was no evidence of ‘‘adherence fatigue’’, with the
proportion of undetectable viral loads rising throughout the
intervention period (64 %, first quarter; 66 %, second
quarter; 69 %, third quarter; and 78 %, fourth quarter).
AUC/day viral load decreased from 2.2 (95 % confi-
dence interval, 1.7–2.6) to 1.9 (1.8–2.0) for intent-to-treat
(t = -1.3, p = 0.19) and from 2.1 (1.7–2.6) to 1.9
(1.8–1.9) in the as-treated (t = -1.2, p = 0.23), but did
not reach statistical significance with the number of
patients available. ART adherence increased from a mean
of 18.8 fills to 20.4 (t = 2.3, p = 0.02) before versus after
the intervention for intent-to-treat, and 19.3–21.0 (t = 2.4,
p = 0.02) as-treated. The correlation between increase in
fills and decrease in AUC/day viral load was r = -0.16
(p = 0.21) in intent-to-treat analysis and was r = -0.21
(p = 0.10) in as-treated patients.
Among all patients enrolled in the study, there was no
evident change in proportion of undetectable viral loads
(76 vs. 77 %, before versus after the intervention) or AUC
viral load, (2.0 versus 1.9, before versus after the inter-
vention). Among the subgroup of patients who had no
detectable viral loads prior to the study period (e.g., those
who inclusion criteria were expanded to because of fairness
concerns), 85 % of viral loads were undetectable during the
study period. There was no evidence that patients on dif-
ferent ART regimens were differentially impacted by the
intervention. Among patients on PI-based regimens, 50 %
had undetectable viral loads after the intervention, whereas
among patients on NNRTI-based regimens, 48 % had
undetectable viral loads after the intervention.
Discussion
This single-site study demonstrates the feasibility of imple-
menting financial incentives aimed at reducing viral load in
HIV patients in care. While other studies have investigated
financial incentives in substance-using populations, this is
the first study of contingency management in an HIV pop-
ulation that is not selected on the basis of active or prior
substance abuse. Our study demonstrates the feasibility of
designing and implementing a financial incentive system in
which the size of the incentive was designed to be cost-
neutral or cost-saving, the primary target of the incentive was
the clinical outcome of interest (e.g., viral load suppression)
rather than the behavior itself (e.g., adherence to ART), and
the incentive algorithm rewarded improvement as well as
achievement yet was difficult to ‘‘game.’’
While our study was not powered for effectiveness
outcomes, it raises the possibility that the incentive pay-
ments contributed to a 12 % increase in undetectable viral
loads (from 57 to 69 %) among the target population.
However, there are many other possible explanations for
the finding, especially given the limitations of this small,
single-site study, such as regression-to-the-mean. Follow-
up studies can use more robust experimental designs to
assess effectiveness. Additional questions that may be
addressed by follow-up studies include whether the





















Proportion of HIV RNA tests with detectable virus
Prior Year
Incentive year
Fig. 2 Number of patients stratified by proportion of HIV RNA tests
with detectable viral load in the incentive year and in the year prior to
the incentive (Color figure online)
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whether the incentive could be implemented using different
amounts, schedules, and levels of certainty (e.g., lottery
versus certain payment) [18–22]. Additional important
limitations of the study include the large prevalence of
patients with prior injection drug use, raising the question
of whether the incentives would be generalizable to a
population with fewer substance users, and the potential
inappropriateness of the incentive schedule for patients
with multiclass genotypic resistance. There was no
screening for multi-class resistance prior to enrollment.
Our prescription measure was ‘‘number of ART medication
refills’’ rather than ‘‘proportion of expected refills,’’ so it is
possible that changes may have reflected differences in
prescribing intervals rather than differences in adherence.
One of the novel features of this study is that the size of
the incentive is linked to future costs averted by preventing
HIV infections due to greater viral load reduction. While
the size of our incentive may seem large ($100 per quarter),
it is important to note that this cost-savings calculation was
based on extremely conservative assumptions, in particu-
lar, substantial viral load reduction from partial ART
adherence prior to any intervention, risk behaviors typical
of individuals who know their serostatus, and modest pre-
ART viral loads. An intervention targeted at one or more
high risk subgroups, in particular individuals with high pre-
intervention viral loads and/or prevalent risk behaviors
could pay up to $2,241 per quarter (Table 1) while still
being offset by future HIV-related costs that are averted.
An important limitation of our method for incentive esti-
mation is that we did not consider costs that were unrelated
to transmission (e.g., associated with development of drug
resistance and/or morbidity and mortality from inade-
quately treated HIV) and we did not consider the incre-
mental resource costs of the incentive program itself.
Conclusion
We report that it is feasible to use financial incentives with
the aim of reducing viral load among HIV patients in care,
and to specify the incentive by requiring cost-neutrality,
based on the avoided costs from downstream infections
averted. Future studies are needed to assess its effective-
ness, scalability, and sustainability.
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